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We derive a measure of firm speed of price adjustment that is directly inversely 
related to market power and compare this to the measure derived by Martin (1993). 
However, both measures are incorrect when firms have non-zero price conjectural 
variations and treat competing price levels as exogenous. This is because Taylor 
series expansions of the demand function implicitly assume that firms influence the 
level of competing prices in a way that is consistent with their conjectures. 
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1. Introduction 
One cause suggested for the stable inflationary environment that has existed in many 
countries since the late eighties and early nineties is a lower speed of price adjustment 
by firms (Dwyer and Leong, 2001). Empirical dynamic industry studies often suggest 
that price adjustment is influenced by the level of industry competition, although not 
all agree on the direction of that influence (compare Kraft, 1995; and Shaanan and 
Feinberg, 1995).  
As a means of introducing price rigidities into the theoretical model, 
Rotemberg (1982) includes a quadratic price adjustment cost and minimises loss in  
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profit due to the incomplete adjustment to the static equilibrium price. Other studies 
that derive dynamic pricing equations using this method include Yetman (2003) and 
Martin (1993). Alternatively, Kasa (1998) and Worthington (1989) maximise the 
profit function with the inclusion of a quadratic quantity adjustment cost.  
  By employing a Taylor series approximation to actual profit, Martin (1993) 
shows that the speed of price adjustment is a function of the second derivative of 
profit with respect to price at the static equilibrium price and is negatively related to 
market power in the cases of monopolistic competition and oligopoly with quantity 
conjectures. Maximising the profit function, we show that an alternative speed of 
price adjustment approximation is directly a negative function of market power when 
firms are assumed to have quadratic price adjustment costs. However, neither method 
correctly derives the speed of price adjustment when firms have price conjectural 
variations as usually applied. This discrepancy is resolved if firms believe that they 
influence the level of competing prices in ways that are consistent with their 
conjectures.  
 
2. Speed of price adjustment and market power 
 Let  the  i
th firm have the following profit function: 
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where i and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and  it p ,  it q ,  it mc , and  i α   
indicate the firm price, output, constant marginal cost (excluding adjustment costs) 
and the price adjustment cost parameter, respectively. In the absence of adjustment 
costs, the firm charges the static profit maximising price 
*
it p  and produces output 
*
it q .  
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In this case, the first order condition is  0 ) )( (
* * * = − + it it it it it dp dq mc p q , where 
) (
*
it it dp dq is the slope of the demand function in static equilibrium.  
Taking a first-order Taylor series approximation of output around the static 
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The following partial adjustment model results after substituting (2) into (1) and profit 
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where  1 − − = ∆ it it it p p p  and  it λ  is the speed of price adjustment. Note (3) is derived 
with the use of the static first-order condition. Given that the elasticity of demand in 
static equilibrium [ ) )( (
* * * *
it it it it it q p dp dq = η ] is a measure of market power, (3) 
implies that as market power increases, the speed of pricing adjustment decreases for 
a given 
*
it p  and 
*
it q . 
  The speed of price adjustment derived by Martin (1993) is as follows:  
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where ) ( "
*
it p π  is the second derivative of the profit function at the static equilibrium 
price when there are no adjustment costs. Generally, however, the speeds of price 
adjustment in (3) and (4) will not be equal. The exception to this is when the demand 
function is linear and the Taylor series expansions are exact i.e. 
) 2 / ) ( " ( ) (
* *
it it it p dp dq π − = − . Next we show that even when firms have linear demand 
functions, neither of the above speed of adjustment measures is correct when firms 
have non-zero price conjectures but treat competing price levels as exogenous. 
 
3. Speed of price adjustment when firms have price conjectures. 
  Price conjectural variations are frequently used to model firm conduct in 
heterogenous product industries (for example, Bloch and Olive, 2003; Allen, 1998; 
and Dornbusch, 1987). They represent the expected pricing responses of other firms 
in the industry to a change in the firm’s own price. The larger the firm’s price 
conjectures the less competitive its behaviour.  
 Let  the  i
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where  it A  is a demand shift variable,  jt p  is the price of the j
th firm, and  i a  and  j b  are 
positive parameters. Taking the derivative of (5) with respect to the i
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where  jit it jt dp dp θ =  is the firm’s price conjectural variation with respect to the 
price of the j
th firm.
1 After substituting (6) into (3), the resultant speed of price 
adjustment is  ∑ ∑
≠ ≠




jit j i it b a b a ] ) ( /[ ) ( α θ θ λ . It can be seen that the speed 
of price adjustment decreases as the weighted sum of the price conjectural variations 
increases. This speed of pricing adjustment is the same as (4) when demand is linear 
and the price conjectural variations are constant with respect to price. 
  An alternative method of estimating the speed of price adjustment is to 
maximise the profit function from (1) when the i
th firm has the linear demand function 
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where  it δ  is the speed of price adjustment and 
*
it p  is the equilibrium price in the 
absence of adjustment costs. While the qualitative impact of the price conjectural 
variations is the same as above, it is clear that it it λ δ ≠ . 
  This discrepancy is resolved if the firm believes that a part of competing 
prices is endogenous in a way that is consistent with the firm’s conjectures. Let the i
th 
firm’s belief about the j
th firm’s price be represented by the following linear 
relationship:  
                                                            
1 Price conjectural variations are most commonly presented as elasticities. However, presenting price 
conjectures as the conjectured rate of change in a competing firm’s price for a marginal change in the 
firm’s own price is analogous to the usual presentation of quantity conjectures.   
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where  j c  represents a component of the competing price that the i
th firm believes it 
cannot influence.
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Comparing (7) and (9), it can be seen that the makeup of the static equilibrium price 
and the speed of price adjustment are interrelated. Now all three methods for 
calculating the speed of price adjustment lead to the same result when firms have 
linear demand functions.  
  The discrepancy in speed of price adjustment measures arises because Taylor 
series expansions of the demand function implicitly assume that a component of 
competing prices is endogenous in a way that is consistent with firm conjectures.  
To see this, take the following first-order Taylor series approximation of output 
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2 Note that this is different to consistent conjectures that equate the slope of the 
competing firm reaction functions with its conjectures, although consistent 
conjectures could be encompassed in this formulation.   




jt p  is the j
th firm’s static equilibrium price,  it it p q ∂ ∂
*  is the own-price partial 
derivative of demand and  jt it p q ∂ ∂
* is the cross-price partial derivative of demand. If 
the prices of all competing firms are exogenous, as in the conventional conjectural 
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(11) and (2) are equivalent, as the total derivative of the i
th firm’s output is 
∑
≠
∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ =
i j
jit jt it it it it it p q p q dp dq θ ) (
* * * . 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper derives firm speed of price adjustment as a function of the slope of 
the demand function when firms have quadratic price adjustment costs. This directly 
inversely relates market power to the speed of price adjustment and provides an 
alternative to the measure derived by Martin (1993). However, both measures are 
incorrect when firms have price conjectural variations as they are usually applied. 
This is because Taylor series expansions of the demand function implicitly suggest 
that firms divide competing prices into exogenous and endogenous components in a 
way that is consistent with their conjectures, while the standard method does not make 
this division. In which of these ways firms behave is an empirical question that is 
worthy of further consideration.   
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